Generic proof systems like Isabelle provide some limited but useful metatheoretic facilities for declared logics; in particular, users can prove simple derived rules and also`solve' formulae that contain metavariables | a technique useful for, e.g., program synthesis. We show how an arbitrary rst order theory can be conservatively extended to provide similar facilities, without a supporting metatheory, and examine what the limitations of this approach are.
Introduction
Using a generic proof development system like Isabelle 12] to prove theorems of a logic is sometimes easier than using a custom-built prover. This is because the generic system contains a metalogic in which object logics are encoded and this may allow extra methods of proof construction.
In this paper we look at two examples of this. First, in the metalogic, users can derive new rules or lemmas for the object logic and specializations of these can be applied later, during proof construction. Deriving these is not always possible in the object logic itself | for example, rst-order logic (FOL) cannot express rules that contain variables ranging over rstorder formulae. Second, if the generic proof system supports metavariables, e.g. Isabelle, we can delay commitment during proof, i.e. we prove that a formula P( ) has some desired property, without having to give explicitly at the beginning of the proof building process (so that the proof and the formula being proved are developed together). This delaying of commitment can make it easier to construct proofs, since we can wait until we have more detailed information about what must be, before we have to decide on the details of its structure.
Our contribution is to show that, rather than using a system like Isabelle, these kinds of extensibility can be directly added to an arbitrary rst-order theory by conservatively extending it with quanti ers over formulae; that is, without recourse to an independent metatheory. This can be seen as a proof theoretic investigation into aspects of the metatheory of various generic proof systems and how they can be simulated in weak extensions of rst-order theories. While we hope our contribution has conceptual value we are not arguing for a change in practice: there are many advantages in using generic development systems that we do not address here. For example, systems based on type theory o er capabilities of representing proofs as terms in the logic which are built from constructive derivations 1] and the metalogic may be well suited for proof search which enables automated theorem proving for encoded object logics 13, 15] .
Before providing technical details, we further motivate the two kinds of metatheoretic extensions we would like to capture, which are related to universally and existentially quanti ed variables in the metalogic.
Universally quanti ed metavariables
In theorem proving, we often encounter instances of the same pattern of reasoning. For instance, given a goal :9x(p(x)) we might want to simplify this using the fact that for any formula , if 8x: then :9x (1) to move the negation through the quanti er. However this transformation is not usually given as a rule or axiom of rst-order logic, even though it is provable for each particular instance. If we do not want to type in the primitive derivation each time we need it, what is the most convenient way to make this fact available? A proof development system often contains a tactic language or a lemma facility and these are used to capture certain patterns of reasoning. Tactics are the most primitive solution: instead of having to enter the steps of the derivation by hand each time, the user can write a program to perform the steps automatically. This way, the same primitive steps are performed (which guarantees correctness) but reliably and quickly by the machine. This, however, still takes time, and a tactic by its nature is a procedure which is often more di cult to understand than a declarative statement like (1) .
A lemma facility does not have the problems of a tactic language: instead of building a proof each time, the user can store proven theorems to be reused as needed; thus there is no problem with speed (the theorem is already there to be used) or in understanding which theorem a tactic constructs. Unfortunately, a lemma cannot capture (1), because this cannot be written in FOL: we are not able to formalize the phrase`for any formula ', because we cannot quantify over formulae.
If we could do this we could prove a single theorem and store as a lemma to be instantiated as necessary. But we would need something like a higherorder logic, in which we could write and prove (1) as 8 
Unfortunately, higher-order logics are much more complex than rst-order ones, and introduce new di culties, even as they solve one. For instance many theorem proving techniques that work well in FOL either break in a higher-order setting or become much more ine cient (e.g. uni cation).
More seriously, even when we restrict ourself to reasoning about sentences in our original language, we may nd that more formulae become provable: the new, more expressive, theory may not be conservative over the original. Now consider what we can do if we have quanti ers in the metatheory; we are able to formalize (1) precisely, as 1 ( )((`8x ) ) (`:9x: )):
(3) This is a formula in the metalogic de ning a derived rule of FOL | the outside ( ) quanti es over formulae in the object logic, but does it in the metalogic | and we can prove such a formula in the metalogic, and store it as a lemma of that logic. Then we can instantiate it as necessary for use in particular derivations in the object logic. Further, this way we do not modify the object theory, so there is no risk of proving something that is not a theorem of the original logic. Several variations on this approach have been developed: Goguen 7] , for instance, shows how, for the algebraic system OBJ, we get the equivalent of the metatheoretic facilities that we would like to have by allowing theories to be schematic; Boyer et al. 3] argue for a similar kind of schematic theorem facility in their Nqthm theorem prover.
Existentially quanti ed metavariables
In a system with an explicit metatheory, however, we are able to do something that neither Goguen nor Boyer and Moore consider. In the Isabelle system we can use higher-order uni cation to compose rules and axioms, and, like in (3), we are allowed metavariable`holes' in object logic formulae. In (3) the metavariable is in a lemma, and universally quanti ed, but we can equally have metavariables in the formula we are trying to prove, and 1 We use ( )A and (E )A to denote universal and existential quanti cation at the metalevel, and ) to indicate metalevel implication.
there is no obligation to quantify them universally. If we do this, then, as we build a proof, uni cation can instantiate metavariables with object-level syntax as necessary to ensure that we always have a valid proof schema. As a trivial example, we might try to provè (P(a)^Q(b) ! R(a; b)) $ (4) where we want the metavariable hole on the right to be the implicational form of the formula on the left. We can unify (computing instances for metavariables) this against the bi-implication in the already proven lemma
and as a result is instantiated to P(a) ! Q(b) ! R(a; b). 
where S is a speci cation with parameters x 1 ; : : :; x n and is a metavariable which, at the end, is instantiated with a formula, representing a logic program that is a recursive version of same. Other applications of the use of metavariables for synthesis are discussed in Clement 4] and Hesketh 8] .
Again there is a close relationship between what we are doing here and goals existentially quanti ed over formulae; i.e. (5) could also be written as (E )(`8x 1 ; : : :; x n (S(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) $ (x 1 ; : : :; x n ))); (6) provided the E is taken to be constructive in the sense that we can nd some formula A for that satis es the interior of the formula. (We should point out that there are actually no existential quanti ers in Isabelle, but metavariables in goals allow us to behave as if there are).
Outline of paper
In x2 we propose a method for adding universal and existential quanti cation over propositions to rst-order logic, as a way of providing similar facilities to those described above, and we show that this extension is conservative. We then consider how to recover witnesses for second-order existential quanti ers, and show that there are signi cant di erences between intuitionistic and classical theories: To recover witnesses in intuitionistic theories we have to restrict applications of rules for disjunction slightly. We prove that this restriction is necessary, and discuss how it relates to restrictions in Isabelle. After, we show how this restriction can be lifted for classical theories. In x3, we give examples of applications, and in x4 we present our conclusions.
2 Quanti ers over formulae, and their theory 2.1 LJ 2 De nition 1 (The theory LJ) We take the theory LJ to be a standard presentation of intuitionistic rst-order logic as it can be found in, e.g., Gentzen 5] or Girard 6] : the class of formulae L LJ is de ned as ?; `B (
The reader should be familiar with the standard proof of the cut elimination theorem for LJ. In particular we need induction on the lexicographically ordered pair hR; Si, where R is the logical complexity of the cut formula, measured as the number of logical connectives, and S is the depth of the proof tree.
De nition 2 (The language L LJ 2 ) The language L LJ 2 is the smallest extension of the language L LJ closed under the following: (8) (where p is an abstracted formula, and the standard side conditions on 8 2 -r and 9 2 -l that not appear free in ?; B hold).
Cut-elimination and Conservativity
We now explore the properties of the rami ed second-order logic we have de ned. We begin by de ning a special category of cuts, which we call second-order', and prove a cut elimination theorem for it.
De nition 4 (Second-order cuts) In applications of the cut rule, (7), if A is a formula containing either 8 2 or 9 2 , then the cut is called second-order.
We can now prove the following:
Proposition 5 If a sequent ?`A is provable in LJ 2 then it is provable without second-order cuts. Proof: The proof is by induction on derivations, and similar to ordinary cut elimination, except that we treat rst-order cuts like any other rule. We use a lexicographic ordering on the triple hQ; R; Si where R and S are, like in the usual proof, the complexity of the cut formula and the number of steps in the derivation, and Q is the number of second-order quanti ers in the cut formula.
Since most of the cases for the induction are the same as for ordinary cut elimination, we assume familiarity with them, and look only at some of the new ones. Consider 9 2 ; i.e. where the proof of the cut formula is a proof with 9 and, since the S measure of the subderivation ending with the second-order cut is now smaller, it can, by appeal to the hypothesis, be restructured to be cut free; when the cut is on the right hand side the transformation is similar. And the theorem follows.
Readers familiar with cut-elimination can see that all cuts can be eliminated; but, in general, we cannot do this for an arbitrary theory that we might de ne as an axiomatic extension of LJ 2 . We discuss this shortly (corollary 8).
We now point out that second-order cut free proofs enjoy a property similar to the subterm property for cut free proofs:
Remark 6 If a proof is free of second-order cuts then application of any of the rules in (8) would result in a second-order quanti er appearing in the root sequent. This follows since the only way such quanti ers, after having been introduced by a rule application, could disappear before the root sequent, is by a second-order cut, and there are no such cuts in the proof. Now we can give a conservativity result, where conservativity is de ned as follows:
De nition 7 (Conservativity) A theory T 0 with language L 0 is conservative over a theory T with language L if any formula F of L \ L 0 provable in T 0 is provable in T.
We do not want just to show that LJ 2 is conservative over LJ, but rather something more general and useful: that LJ 2 extended to some theory like arithmetic is conservative over the rst-order version. Thus de ne LJ 2 +Ax, where Ax is a set of formulae, to be the theory LJ 2 extended with all sequents of the form`A, where A is in Ax; and de ne Ax to be the set of formulae generated from Ax by every possible predicate-variable-free instantiation of predicate variables in Ax. Then we show that Corollary 8 For any set of formulae Ax not containing second-order quanti ers, the theory LJ 2 + Ax is conservative over LJ + Ax .
Proof: This follows because the transformations used earlier in the procedure for eliminating second-order cuts are still allowed, so we can transform a proof in LJ 2 + Ax of a formula F in the language L LJ into a proof free of second-order cuts, and thus, by remark 6, a proof in which none of (8) are used. Predicate variables might still occur in the proof, having been introduced by base sequents either from LJ 2 or Ax. In either case, choose an instantiation of these free of propositional variables. The result of this is a derivation in LJ + Ax .
Remark 9 By the corollary we can immediately implement, for instance, any classical rst-order theory in LJ 2 by taking Ax to be of the form Ax f8x 1 ; 8x n ( (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) _ : (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) j n a natural numberg where is a n-ary predicate variable.
We now have machinery su cient to allow us to do what Goguen, and Boyer et al. do: for an arbitrary rst-order theory we can formalize and prove the universal closure of schematic rst-order formulae like (2). Our conservativity result guarantees that their use does not result in any more rst-order theorems becoming provable.
Realising existential predicate variables
The logic we have developed provides more than is needed for formalizing and using rst-order schematic proof rules: if this was all that we wanted, we could delete the second-order existential quanti ers and associated rules from LJ 2 . However we want to work with formulae like (6) . To this end, ideally we would like a theorem as follows:
Hypothesis 10 Given a proof of a formula 9 2 A in LJ 2 we can transform this into a proof of A p= ] for some abstracted formula p.
Unfortunately, this is false. The natural way to construct a witness for is by structural recursion on the proof, but we immediately encounter a problem with this, when we try to deal with the rule for introducing _ on the left:
?; A`9 2 P( ) ; B`9 2 P( ) _-l ?; ; A _ B`9 2 P( )
There is no obvious way to construct a witness for the in the goal, given witnesses for the two instances of in the subgoals. In fact, this generally cannot be done. Proposition 11 It is not possible to nd a witness for the outside secondorder existential quanti er in a theorem in an arbitrary extension of LJ 2 . Proof: We give a simple rst-order theory T, a theorem 9 2 P( ) of LJ 2 + T where P contains no second-order quanti ers, and a (Kripke) model of LJ + T where no instance of P( ) is true. From this it follows that there is no instantiation of for which P( ) is provable.
First we give the facts we need about Kripke models of intuitionistic logic. Our account comes directly from 16, x5.3], and we only remind the reader what is critical to follow our example. A model of intuitionistic predicate logic is a quadruple M = hK; ; C; Di that meets a number of conditions. Relevant for our example is that K is a partially ordered set of worlds and is a function from worlds to sets of atomic sentences that states which basic facts hold at each world (we do not need C and D here; we include them simply to be consistent with 16]). Facts are cumulative in the sense that for k; l 2 K, if k l then (k) (l). We write k A, for the atomic fact A when A 2 (k); this may be extended to a unique relation over all formula (we consider only propositional connectives here) as follows: We can prove that 9 2 P( ) in LJ 2 + T:
A`P(C) 9 2 -r A`9 2 P( ) B`P(D) 9 2 -r B`9 2 P( ) Compare what happens in Isabelle to (9) ; then the rule is ?; A`P( ) ; B`P( ) ?; ; A _ B`P( ) (10) where is a single metavariable, not two existentially quanti ed object predicate variables. This means that we are able to instantiate as we like, but this instantiation takes place over the entire proof, not just in a sequent at some particular leaf of the tree; i.e. Isabelle will ensure that the occurrences of in the proof are instantiated identically. This sharing across subproofs introduces`non-local' e ects into the derivation: by doing something at one subgoal that instantiates in some way, another subgoal also containing can become suddenly unprovable. We can, in fact, see the problem with combining the two instances of in (9) as simply the result of not insisting, as Isabelle does, that the two witnesses are the same.
We have shown that, in general, we cannot recover a witness for an existentially quanti ed predicate variable. In x2. 5 we will show that if we restrict ourselves to classical theories, this result no longer holds; in fact we can then recover witnesses in some circumstances beyond what Isabelle allows. On the other hand, in Isabelle we can work with metavariables in, e.g., intuitionistic logics, and further, the terms we synthesise using metavariables are not the same as the terms generated by the methods discussed in x2.5. So, before looking at what happens in classical logic, we investigate the general case that corresponds more closely to metavariables as we nd them in, e.g. Isabelle.
Realisability for intuitionistic theories
Since the rule _-l (i.e. (9) Because LJ R 2 is a subtheory of LJ 2 we can eliminate cuts from derivations in it just like in LJ 2 , so the conservativity results for LJ 2 still hold (the restriction does not prevent any derivations in the subtheory LJ, since it rules out only certain formulae with quanti ers over propositions). However the transformed proof may no longer be a proof LJ R 2 but only in LJ 2 ;
i.e. there may be occurences of _-l where the consequent is of the form 9 Proof: Given any proof of`9 2 A in LJ R 2 , there is a chain of rule applications extending from the root of the proof all of which have 9 2 A as a consequent|call this the path. There are no branches on the path, because no applications of the rule _-l are permitted. The path may, however, run through rst or second-order cuts which introduce new assumptions. We show that we can remove enough second-order cuts from the path so that it is possible to recover a witness for the existential while remaining in LJ R 2 . We call second-order formulae that have been cut into the path, but which are not in the class F R 2`s afe' because we can safely apply the cutelimination transformations to such cuts|there is no risk of such a transformation introducing an _-l onto the path (since by the de nition of LJ R 2 there cannot be an _-l above the cut formula which could be introduced), which would remove the derivation from LJ R 2 . Thus we can remove all safe second-order cuts from the path.
Consider the path now. There are two cases to consider: either it ends at an application of 9 2 -r or at a basic sequent. Since the consequent of the sequent in the path is safe, if the path is to end in a basic sequent then somehow a safe formula has to appear in the hypothesis list. This cannot get there directly, by a cut, since there are now no safe cuts in the path, however it might be possible to manipulate some unsafe formula that has been cut-in, to produce a safe one. We can show that this cannot happen, by induction on the structure of F R 2 . The only interesting case is when the unsafe formula is of the form A ! B where A is possibly safe; the only way we can manipulate such a term is by !-l, which leaves only the unsafe B on the path, the possibly safe A gets moved o as the goal of a sub-derivation.
Thus there can be no safe formulae on the path, so the path cannot end in a basic sequent.
In the rst case, we can simply delete the rule, and the result will still be a proof, but of`A p= ] for some p. Notice that because of the way we have de ned abstracted formulae, no new variable can suddenly appear on the path as a result of substituting p through for , to make some application of 9-l suddenly invalid, and we have already ensured that there are no instances of 9 2 -l on the path since there are no safe second-order cuts on it.
In the process of nding the witness for a second-order quanti er in LJ R This is, as we pointed out before, the condition that is enforced in Isabelle, where uni cation is used to ll out metavariables occurring in di erent branches of a proof identically.
Realizability restricted to classical theories
So far we have been thinking of general extensions of intuitionistic logic, including classical logic. This has meant that we have had to place some side conditions on the proof rules. But, observe that if we restrict ourselves to classical theories (c.f., remark 9), then we can remove these conditions: we have that Proposition 15 Given a proof of 9 2 A in Cl 2 + T we can transform this into a proof in Cl 2 + T of A p= ] for some abstracted formula p. Proof: The point of the restrictions in LJ R 2 is to ensure that we are able to recover witnesses for existentially quanti ed predicate variables, and we cannot do this in the case of an application of _-l: the problem is, in the circumstance of (9), given witnesses A and B for in ?; A`9 2 P( ) and ; B`9 2 P( ), to nd a formula F( A ; B ; A; B) that is logically equivalent to exactly one of A or B , depending on whether A is true or false. But in a classical theory we can use the term
since we know, a priori, that A _ :A.
Aside from the fact that this approach fails for intuitionistic theories, it introduces additional complexity not present when manipulating metavariables directly in schematic proofs. In particular, the witnessing formula is more complex when _-l is applied to a sequent whose goal is quanti ed with 9 2 . This additional complexity is because a wider class of proofs is possible here than in Isabelle: as we pointed out earlier, there are proofs which use _-l duplicate a formula containing a metavariable onto two branches, so that the metavariable is instantiated identically in each branch. Here we are allowed more freedom and, as a result, require a more complex realizer. Note however that when both branches are instantiated identically we can simplify (11) to A , which is identical to what we get in Isabelle.
Finally, we point out that the theories that we have described here, with their associated results, are essentially fragments of the rami ed higher-order logics that Prawitz discusses 14, V.x2] (based on natural deduction, rather than the sequent calculus used here). However, Prawitz's normalization results are for the pure form of his logic and we are primarily interested in extensions with arbitrary rst-order theories, where such normalization is not possible. Further, we are concerned with nding witnesses for second-order existential quanti ers in such extensions (which we get by the restriction we place on abstracted formulae in de nition 2.3).
Applications
With the machinery that we have developed, we reexamine the kinds of extensibility discussed in x1.
Universal quanti cation
Consider a more complex example than (1): if we work in a theory like arithmetic, we might like to use some other induction schema than the standard structural induction provided in Peano Arithmetic (PA); e.g. courseof-values induction
In a system like Isabelle we can prove this schematic version directly, with A universally quanti ed at the metalevel. Now, take AR 2 as LJ 2 extended with the axioms of PA, with a single schematic version of the induction axiom, instead of the in nite set of instances. By corollary 8 this is conservative over the rst-order axiomatization of PA. We can easily show that:
Proposition 16 In the theory AR 2 :
Proof: We follow the standard textbook proof and assume an arbitrary and the antecedent of !. After, we generalize to 8z8t(t < z ! (t)) which we prove using structural induction on z: the base case, z = 0 follows vacuously since t < z is false, while, in the step case, we have to show that 8t(t < s(z) ! (t)) under the hypothesis 8t(t < z ! (t)). For t < z we use the hypothesis and, for t = z, the antecedent of the original goal follows again by the hypothesis. This argument can be formalized in AR 2 , since the induction formula contains no second-order quanti ers. Now we have a single theorem, which we can store as a lemma, and use to generate instances of course-of-values induction as necessary. But this is not quite enough yet: we have proven the course-of-values schema only for formulae with exactly one parameter. If we need an instance where has additional parameters, we would seem to need a new schema with additional parameters. However we can instead make use of the simple metatheorem about our calculus.
Lemma 17 If a theorem F contains a quanti ed predicate variable of arity n, then if we uniformly substitute (t 1 ; : : :; t n ) through with (t 1 ; : : :; t n ; t n+1 ), where t n+1 is an arbitrary term (avoiding capture), then the new formula is also a theorem. Proof: The proof is by structural induction on proofs. The base case is trivial, and the important subcases of the step case are the rules (8): it is easy to see how the applications of these must be modi ed in the proof so that the new formula is proven; for instance, for the 8 2 -l rule we just have to add a new lambda abstracted variable to the arguments of the abstracted predicate p which will pick up the new term t n+1 .
For the reader familiar with 11], this metatheorem directly corresponds to how rules are lifted over context parameters in systems like Isabelle.
Existential quanti cation
Consider a simple synthesis example: converting a propositional formula to its conjunctive normal form (cnf) in classical logic. We look at how this works in a system like Isabelle, and in our logic.
We can give rules for converting formulae to cnf as a set of rewrite rules. identical to (13) , except for the added application of 9 2 -r at the bottom.
Also, even though we are working in the theory Cl 2 our proof is compatible with theorem 13; we did not need to resort to proposition 15.
Conclusions
We have proposed a way to extend intuitionistic or classical rst-order theories conservatively with quanti cation over formulae as a way to provide what we normally regard as metatheoretic facilities, while introducing as few changes as possible into the logic. In part, we have tried to emulate what is available in a system like Isabelle. Our second-order universal quanti ers can be seen as generalizing the kinds of schematic lemma facilities that Goguen, and Boyer et al. propose, and, together with existential quanti cation, as reproducing some of the metatheoretic facilities available in a framework proof development system. Moreover our proof-theoretic proofs can be contrasted with Goguen's semantic proofs of the conservativity of second-order quanti ers 7, appendix]. We are sympathetic to the relative clarity and brevity of semantic proofs in general, but our proof theoretic analysis does not commit us to a particular semantics and allows us, in the end, to remove systematically all traces of the new machinery that we have introduced. Our second-order existential quanti ers are similar, in some respects, to what we nd in a constructive higher-order logic. However, we only require restricted kinds of proof normalization; we do not require normalization of the rst-order component (indeed, we want to avoid this) nor, for example, that the theories satisfy the disjunction property. Finally, unlike in a framework system, our extensions are part of the logic itself, rather than the result of a two-level system with a formal metalogic.
